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1 INTRODUCTION 
Wage setting arrangements differ fundamentally in Western economies. They 
vary from decentralized wage setting, mainly at the level of the firm, to cen- 
tralized bargaining between ational union movements and employer federa- 
tions. Examples of the former are the US and Japan, and of the latter the 
Scandinavian countries and Austria. Countries where bargaining takes place at 
industry level can be found too, for instance The Netherlands and Belgium. In 
some of these countries, individual unions have become affiliated into a federa- 
tion of unions. Centralized wage setting arrangements allow macroeconomic 
considerations to be taken into account. Recently, several authors have 
discussed the consequences of different wage setting arrangements onthe levels 
of wages and employment and on macroeconomic performance (see, e.g. 
Nickell and Andrews (1983), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984a) and (1984b), 
Abraham (1987), Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Mulder (1988) and (1989)). 
Following ideas of Oswald (1979) and (1982), we consider a two-sector 
economy with two unions, one in each sector. We assume that unions care 
about he real wage (of their members) and the level of employment in their sec- 
tor of industry. The unions are mutually dependent upon each other: wage 
claims of one union influence the utility of the other union. The central ques- 
tion we study in this paper is whether coordination between unions leads to 
lower wages and higher employment, compared to the situation where unions 
do not cooperate. This question is particularly relevant for countries like The 
Netherlands, in which federations of unions exist that are, in principle, able to 
coordinate member unions' strategies. A classical remedy against oo high an 
unemployment rate is a reduction in the real wage level. In a multi-sector 
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economy a sectorial wage reduction has to be distinguished from an economy- 
wide wage reduction. A reduction in sectorial wages accompanied by the same 
demand as before will be associated with an increase in employment. When 
wages are reduced throughout the economy, the outcome, however, is not ob- 
vious. If  the demand diminishes as a result of the wage decrease, the positive 
effect might be off-set by a shortage of demand. In that case a decrease in the 
overall wage level may lead to higher unemployment. Since Keynes's General 
Theory, this phenomenon has been known as the fallacy or composition. Our 
model captures both cases. 
In the mainstream literature on trade unions, there are two approaches tothe 
modelling of  the outcome of the bargaining process between a union and a 
firm. Firstly, in the monopoly model the union tries to maximize its utility 
function given the demand for labour. In this case the union sets the wage and 
the firm the level of employment, given this wage rate. Secondly, the efficient 
bargains model has the union maximizing its utility function subject o some 
minimum level of profit for the firm. In that case the parties are bargaining 
about their respective positions on a contract curve. Nickell and Andrews' 
(1983) 'right to manage' model offers an alternative. They suppose that, 
although unions are aware of the demand curve, they and the employers actual- 
ly bargain about he wage. We opt for the monopoly model in this paper, which 
is a special case of the right-to-manage model, to keep the analysis as simple as 
possible. The union sets the wage and the firms adjust heir demand for labour 
correspondingly. 
In our two-sector economy a wage claim of a union in one sector has not only 
a direct effect on the employment level in its own sector, but also an indirect ef- 
fect on employment in the other sector. We have to distinguish positive and 
negative xternalities, which correspond to spill-over and envy effects as in- 
troduced by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984b). A positive (negative) externality 
indicates that agents in one sector benefit from an increase (decrease) in the 
wage set by the union in the other sector. If positive (negative) externalities ex- 
ist, non-cooperating unions set their wage claims too low (high). If the unions 
coordinate their activities, the result will be a higher wage in case of a positive 
externality and a lower wage in case of a negative xternality. Attention is 
focused upon the concept of strategic omplementarity as well. Applied to the 
game played between the unions in our model, this is the feature that the op- 
timal wage level of a union depends positively on the wage set by the other 
union, see e.g. Cooper and John (1988). 
We need a model of the whole economy to derive the indirect effect of a wage 
claim of a union in one sector and on employment in the other sector. The heart 
of our model has been derived from Cooper (1988) and is similar to e.g. Hart 
(1982). Cooper builds a two-sector general equilibrium model with imperfect 
competition. He assumes that firms choose output levels and that prices equate 
demand and supply in each sector. Crucial to his and our model is the circular 
flow of money. Our model differs from Cooper's model in the determination 
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of wages: Cooper assumes wages to be exogenous, while in our model wages 
are set by unions. The general equilibrium model considered has interesting 
features, apart from the issue of coordination between unions. Firstly, the 
model may exhibit multiplier effects. A necessary and sufficient condition for 
multiplier effects is strategic omplementarity, the concept discussed earlier. 
Secondly, the multiplier increases if the number of firms in a sector becomes 
larger. 
A game is defined that consists of two subgames. In the first subgame unions 
play against each other and determine the equilibrium wage vector. In the se- 
cond subgame first determine the demand for labour given the outcome of the 
first subgame, the wage, and the demand for goods. The solution of the game 
is tackled the other way around. Firstly, the sectorial output is derived for each 
sector as a function of the output in the other sector, for a given wage level. 
Then the subgame played between the unions is solved. The outcome of this 
(first) subgame is the wage vector. The unions know the effects of their wage 
claims on the demand for labour by firms, they know how the outcome of the 
second subgame is influenced by their wage claims. The consequences of coor- 
dination can easily be ascertained. The outcomes in terms of wages and 
employment for non-cooperative unions are compared with the outcomes 
when unions coordinate. 
Our model is closely related to Abraham (1987). In his model externalities 
arise as well, but he comes to a different conclusion. There are two important 
differences in assumptions between Abraham's model and our model. Firstly, 
whereas Abraham assumes competitive domestic goods markets, we assume 
the goods markets to be oligopolistic. Secondly, our model has explicit micro- 
foundations. Abraham's main conclusion is that in his model a wage increase 
in one industry reduces the real wage rate and employment levels in other in- 
dustries and thus creates a negative xternality. Our model, on the other hand, 
may result in negative as well as positive externalities. 
The paper is organized as follows. First the second game is described. The 
demand for labour by firms has to be derived for all combinations of wage 
levels. For this purpose a model of the whole economy is required. The model 
is presented in section 2. In section 3 the second game is solved and the impact 
of wages on employment is derived. Moreover, multiplier effects are discussed. 
Union behaviour is not introduced until section 4. The first game, the one be- 
tween the unions, is solved in this section. The final section contains ome con- 
cluding remarks. 
2 THE MODEL 
Before the effects of union behaviour on the wage level and employment can be 
determined, a model of the whole economy is needed. We consider a small 
open economy consisting of two sectors (A and B) in which six types of agents 
are operating: for each sector one type of firm, one type of household and one 
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union. There are four domestic markets: two goods markets and two labour 
markets (one for each sector). Households' labour is assumed to be sector 
specific: there is no labour mobility between sectors. For simplicity we assume 
that households and (owners of) firms do not consume goods produced in their 
own sector. There is a foreign economy which demands goods from both sec- 
tors and produces a good that is demanded by all types of domestic inhabitants. 
The foreign good serves as numeraire and its price is set equal to 1. A sector 
consists of n firms which are assumed to be Cournot oligopolists in their homo- 
geneous goods market. Prices equate demand and supply on the goods 
markets. The outline of our model starts by discussing the behaviour of firms 
and households. They treat wages as given. The wage is the outcome of the 
game played between wage setting unions. This (second) game is not considered 
until section 4. 
The following notation is used throughout the paper. The subscript ' i j ' 
denotes firm j in sector i (i =A, B); Pi and wi are the output price, respectively 
the wage rate for sector i, Yij is the output of f i rmj  in sector i, Lij is the level of 
employment and nij is the profit of that firm. Yi (=  ~ j= l  Yij) is sector i's out- 
put which is equal to total demand for the goods produced by sector i. 1 All 
firms are assumed to have the same linear technology in which labour is the on- 
ly type of input. We choose our units such that the constant marginal produc- 
tivity of labour is equal to one: 
Yij = L i j -a  i = A ,B ,  j=  1 ... .  ,n 
where a > 0 is a parameter which can be interpreted as a fixed labour input. The 
incorporation of a in the production function has the implication that the 
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. The profit nij firm j in sector i
receives is equal to 
nij = PiYi j -  wiZij = (P i -  wi)Yi j -  wia. 
Firms choose a profit maximizing output level Yij. The owners of firms spend 
their profits on the goods produced in the other sector Y-i and on foreign 
goods yf. This structure of production and consumption is an idealized 
representation of the fact that individuals specialize in production and 
generalize in consumption. The structure facilitates the computations and does 
not influence the qualitative results. The utility of a firm (or more precisely 
their owners) is of the form 
F U~j= [(yF_i)ijla[(yf)ij]l-a i= A ,B ,  j=  1 . . . . .  n andO<a< 1 
1 In order not to complicate the notation too much we do not make a distinction in notation be- 
tween quantities demanded and quantities upplied. 
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and their budget constraint is
P-i(yFi)ij + (Y;) = ~ij, 
where  (yF_i~ j denotes firm ij's demand for the goods produced in the other sec- 
tor and (Y~)ij denotes firm ij's demand for the foreign goods. 
Similarly, households derive utility from consumption of the goods produc- 
ed in the other sector and of foreign goods. The utility function for household 
sector i as a whole is of the form 
U~= [(y~)il:[(yy)d 1-~ i=A,B ,  O<f l< l  ( f l¢a) ,  
where (yH)i denotes total demand of households in sector i for goods produc- 
ed in the other sector; (yfI) i stands for total demand of households in sector i 
for the foreign goods. Households maximize this utility function subject o the 
budget constraint 
H + H P-i(Y-i)i (Y) )i = wiLi, 
where wiL i is labour income; L i is determined by firms's demand for labour. 
As noted above, we assume labour to be sector specific. Special skills and 
knowledge are required in each sector so households can only find a job within 
their own sector. 
A leakage in the circular flow of money is created by the introduction of a 
foreign economy. The foreign economy (or the rest of the world) consumes the 
foreign goods and both domestic goods. Its income If is assumed to be ex- 
ogenous to the model (which is a version of the small country assumption). The 
decision problem of the foreign economy can be written as the maximization 
problem 
max u f  = (yf)r(yf)r(yf) l -2e O<y<½ 
subject o pAyf  +pByf + y f  = If, 
where yA f denotes foreign demand for good A, y f  foreign demand for good B 
and yf  foreign demand for the foreign goods. 
All three utility maximizing problems can be solved in the same way by set- 
ting the marginal rate of substitution between two goods equal to the price ratio 
(see Varian (1984, p. 116-117)). Making use of the budget constraints, the de- 
mand for goods YA and ye by households, firms and the foreign economy can 
326 J. JACOBS AND M. JANSSEN 
be derived. The demand from all these different sources can be aggregated to 
the sectorial demands: 
anB flwB(yB+ntr) + ylf = 
yA =- -+ 
PA PA PA 
ap~YB + ( f l -  a) wB(YB + na) + ylf 
PA 
(1) 
otT"g A flWA(YA q-na ) _]_ ~)If= yB = + 
PB PB PB 
O~pA yA q- ( f l -  ~t ) WA ( Y A -b ha)  q- y l f  
PB 
(2) 
Walras" law assures that the balance of payments i in equilibrium. This can be 
seen as follows. Adding equations (1) and (2) gives 
PAYA + PBYB = Ot(7~A +~ZB) + fl(WALA + wBLB) + 2yIf. 
Using the fact that PiYi = 7~i -[- wiLi ,  i = A, B gives 
(1 - a)(n A + riB) + (1 - - f l ) (WAL A + wBL~) = 2?If, 
which is the equilibrium condition for the balance of payments. 
Thus, demand in sector i depends, among other things, on the production in 
the other sector - i .  Firms take sectorial demand curves for goods and the wage 
to be paid as given. Therefore, the profit maximizing output level y* depends 
on the output levels chosen by the other firms in the same sector Yi,-j 
(= Ek , j  Yik) and on the total output level of the other sector, i.e. a firm's 
reaction curve is of the form, 
Y~ = f(Yi , - j ,Y- i ;  wA, ws). 
In the next section we will give expressions for these 'reaction curves.' 
For every pair of wages (w A, wB) we define a Nash equilibrium in output as 
a vector of output levels (Y~I, * * * .... YAh, Ym, ..., YBn) such that 
- f (Y i , - j , Y - i ,  WA,WB) i=A,  Band j= l . . . . .  n. 
To every equilibrium output level corresponds an equilibrium demand for 
labour L~j(w A, wB). In the following section we will discuss the impact of 
wages on employment. 
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3 THE IMPACT OF WAGES ON EMPLOYMENT 
In the previous ection we have defined a Nash equilibrium in output for given 
WA and ws. To determine the Nash equilibrium we start by looking at the pro- 
fit maximizing condition for firm j in sector i: 
(P i -  wi) + Yij(OPi/OYij) = 0 i = A,B .  (3) 
The demand curves (1) and (2) can be inverted to get 
Ri 
- - ,  i=A,B  (4) 
Pi -- Yij+ Yi,_j 
where R i = otp_iy_ i + (fl - or) W_i(y_ i "q- na) + fly, i =A,  B. R i can be interpreted 
as the total amount of numeraire spent on good Yi by the other sector and the 
foreign economy. Equation (3) can now be rewritten as 
Ri Ri 
YiJ+Yi,-J w i -Y i j  (YiJ+Yi,-J) = 0. (5) 
To determine a symmetric Nash equilibrium within sector i we have to solve (5) 
using the symmetry condition (n -  1)y;j=yi,_ j .  The output level in sector i is 
then given by 
~Ri 
yi = , (6) 
wi 
where 0 < (= (n - 1)/n < 1 is a measure of competitiveness. Note that if (=  0, 
there is only one firm, a monopolist, in a sector. In the following, we exclude 
the monopoly case because the profit maximizing output level is indeterminate 
in the monopoly case. A non-negative profit condition implies an upper bound 
on the number of firms per sector, n. 2 
Equations (6) and (4) imply that Pi = wi/~ so that prices are simply a mark- 
up over wages. Substituting the last equality into the demand curves (1) and (2) 
yields a useful relation between the level of activity in both sectors: 
YA = WB [~ + (fl -- a)~lY~ + Ws(fl-- a) ~na + y~If 
W A W A 
(7) 
WA (8) yB = [a+( f l - -~)~]yA+ WA(fl--Ot)~n6r+ y~If 
WB W B 
2 The upper limit is the largest integer that satisfies the condition nij=(1/(-1)wiYij-wia>_O 
and can be calculated by means of equation (9) or (10) below. 
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We will refer to these relations as 'reaction curves.' Note that these are not pro- 
per reaction curves, because they already incorporate the requirements for a 
Nash equilibrium within a sector. Still, equations (6) and (7) indicate the reac- 
tion of a whole sector, in equilibrium, to an output level of the other section. 
The notion of a reaction curve is thus used in a loose way. In Figure 1 equations 
(6) and (7) are drawn for given w A , wB and I f .  The 'reaction curves' are up- 
ward sloping, because a + ( f l -  a) ~ > 0. The figure shows that the output levels 
of the different sectors are strategic omplements of each other: an increase in 
output in sector i leads to a rise in demand in the other sector. 
The intersection point of the two reaction curves in the figure is the Nash 
equilibrium in output for a given pair of wages as defined in the previous ec- 
tion. The equilibrium can be computed by substituting (7) into (6) and is given 
by 
y~ = (~--et)~na + y~If/w A (fl-a)~na[ws/wA-1] 
+ (9) 
1-  [a+ (f l -a)~] 1- [o~+(fl-a)~] 2 
(~-  a) (na [wA/w,-- 1 ] y~ _ ( f l -  a )~na + y~If /wB + (10) 
1- [a+( f l -a )~ l  1 - [a+( f l -a )~]  2 
The intuition behind this result may be grasped as follows. Consider a change 
in I f .  This change causes the reaction curves (7) and (8) to shift outwards. This 
is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The immediate or first order impact of a change zk/f on the reaction curves 
(7) and (8) is y~/W A times z~lIf, 7~/WB times z21/f or respectively YA and YR- 
However, since YA is influenced by YB and vice versa, there are higher order 
YB YA (YB) 
YA ) 
YA 
Figure 1 
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YB YA(YB ) 
(YA) 
YA 
Figure 2 
impacts too. The total effect of AIf on YA, for example, is 
A y A = { ~/W A "l- [0~ "l- ( f l  -- 0I) ~ ] ~)~/W A "-}- [~ "l- ( f l  -- 0~) ~ ] 2 ~/W A q_ ... } ~kl: 
re ab zaz 
~-~m-- .  
1-  [a+(f l -a)~] WA WA 
The equality holds because 0< [a+( f l -a )~]< 1 for all values 0<a,  f l , (< 1. 
The multiplier m is precisely the coefficient with which If enters equation (9). 
The multiplier effect is a consequence of the strategic omplementarity be- 
tween the two sectors. The equation above shows that small shocks from 
abroad may induce large changes in the home economy. Similar expressions 
can be obtained for the impact of WA and w~ on YA and of If, WA and wB on 
Y~. 
A striking feature is that Om/O~>O, which means that the multiplier 
becomes larger as sectors become more competitive. This result can be explain- 
ed from equations (3) and (6). Equation (3) shows that the profit maximizing 
output level depends among others on ~pi/OYij. This term becomes less 
negative when the number of firms increases. The other terms in equation (3) 
are not affected by the number of firms, n. To put it differently, as the number 
of firms increases, the negative impact of an increase in the output of a single 
firm on the sectorial price level decreases. Optimizing output levels thus in- 
crease as the sector becomes more competitive. This results in equation (6) 
from which it can be seen that a Nash equilibrium within a sector is increasing 
in the degree of competitiveness. This is a familiar result in the partial 
equilibrium theory of market forms. It is the main source behind the result hat 
the multiplier is increasing in the number of firms in case there is strategic om- 
plementarity. 
In the analysis of union behaviour, the impact of a change in w A (or ws) on 
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the equilibrium levels of sectorial output (employment) turns out to be a crucial 
quantity. Therefore, we will look at ay*/awi  and Oy*_ i /OW i .  Equations (9) and 
(10) reveal that ay*_i/awi is positive (negative) as fl > ~(fl < a). 
The explanation runs along the following lines. The demand for good Y-i by 
sector i consists of a fraction fl of labour income, wiZ i and a fraction a of pro- 
fit, n i. Labour income equals 
wiL i = wiYi+ wind -- ~gi+ win(7 
from equation (6). Profits can be rewritten as 
~i -'~ (P i -  w i )Y i -  wint7 = (~-1 __ 1)wiY i _ WiHt 7 = (1 - ~)R i - wino. 
Since R i is given for sector i, labour income is increasing in w i, while profits 
are decreasing in w i. How is the demand for good Y- i  affected by a change in 
wi? If households in sector i consume more goods of the other sector than 
owners of firms do (fl > a), then demand for sector - i  increases as wages go up. 
The reverse holds true if fl < a. If ~ is equal to fl the demand for sector - i  goods 
is not affected by a change in wi. 
The evaluation of Oy*/awi is slightly more complicated. In appendix A it is 
shown that Oy~/Owi, i=A,B  cannot be positive. A summary of the possible 
configurations is given in Table 1 and is illustrated in Figure 3 when the impact 
of an upward shift in we is depicted. 
The regions I and II in Figure 3 correspond to the distinguished cases in 
Table 1. We have shown that an upward shift in we will never lead to a Nash 
equilibrium in regions III and IV. In the figure, case II is depicted. In the 
analysis of union behaviour the difference between regions I and II turns out 
to be rather crucial. 
For the outcomes of our model only the difference in consumption behaviour 
of households and firms is crucial. The assumption regarding increasing returns to 
scale, the incorporation of a> 0 in the production function, is only crucial in the 
sense that in case of decreasing returns to scale (a < 0), the conditions with respect 
to a and fl have to be reversed. Only in the case a = 0 differences in consumption 
behaviour of households and firms are not important. The assumption on the type 
of the utility functions used is not crucial either. Cobb-Douglas functions have the 
advantage of making the computations more tractable. Differences in the 
behaviour of firms and households are crucial in our model. 
TABLE 1 
Case Parameter Values Result 
I • > fl Oy~/~ wi <~ O, Oy *-i/a w i ( 0 
II a < fl Oy*/Owi < O, Oy*_~/Owi> 0 
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Figure 3 
4 UNION BEHAVIOUR 
Now it is t ime to consider union behaviour.  Unions are assumed to set the wage 
level in their own sector in such a way as to maximize a quasi-concave Cobb-  
Douglas uti l i ty funct ion with (real) wages and sectorial employment  as 
arguments:  
U i = (w i /P i ) ° (L f )  1-0 i =A,B ,  0~½,  3 
where p i= (p_i)~ x (1) 1 -B = (W_i/~)~ is a consumpt ion price index appropr iate  
to households in sector i. 4 Note that unions know that f irms choose their Nash 
strategies. Labour  supply is assumed suff icient o cover L*.  Since L* depends 
not  only on wi but also on w_i, the uti l ity maximiz ing wage level for union i 
(w*) depends on the wage level set by the other union. A un ion 's  react ion 
curve has the form 
w* = g(w_ i) i = A ,B .  
We define a Nash equi l ibr ium in wages as a wage pair (w~, w~) such that 
w* = g(w*-i) i = A,  B. 
Firstly, we consider the situation that the two unions do not  coordinate their 
activities. In case I of  the previous ection higher wages in sector i lead to lower 
3 If 0 = k utility is the square root of a linear function of wages. Such a utility function does not 
have a maximum value for any wage level. 
4 When membership ofthe union is discerned as a separate argument inthe utility function of the 
union, the results do not change fundamentally. 
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output in sector - i  and hence to lower employment. Higher wages in a sector 
also imply that prices in the same sector increase so that the consumption price 
index in the other sector becomes larger. As unions set the wage level in their 
own sector, this indicates that case I exhibits a negative xternality. The op- 
posite may be true for case II. In case II higher wages in sector i imply higher 
employment levels in the other sector. Case II exhibits a positive externality 
provided that this positive ffect is not offset by the corresponding increase in 
the consumption price index (see below). 
A positive externality is related to the fallacy of composition argument. A
reduction in wages in sector i may seem to be necessary to achieve higher 
employment in the same sector. However, if lower wages imply lower employ- 
ment in the other sector, which is true for case II, then an economy-wide r duc- 
tion in wages may offset the direct employment effect in the own sector 
through a reduction in demand. 
If the union does not incorporate the (positive or negative) externality into its 
own decision, the first order condition for utility maximization isS: 
L* 0L? 
0 -~ +(1-0)  =0 i=A,B. 
wi Owi 
Since L* is directly related to y*, it depends on w_ i. The optimal choice w* 
thus depends also on w_i. The 'reaction curves' Wi(W_i) are  given by 
5 -20[  5+a+(p-a)~ y~If 
wi- 0 L l -a [a+(p-a)~]  na 
5 -20[  ( f l -c0{ l 
+ ~  5-a [a+( f l -a )~]  w-i i=A,B. (51) 
and the Nash equilibrium in wages is given by 
I l+a+( f l -a )~ l y~ I  f (12) 
w~=w~=(1-20)  O(5_a2)+(20_l_ctO)(fl_a)~ na 
Equations (51) and (12) are derived in appendix B. 
In order to get meaningful results w~ and w~ have to be positive. This means 
that we have one of the following cases: 
0(5 -- t~ 2 ) 
(i) 0<0<½ and p<a+ 
((5 + aO- 20) 
5 It is easy to see that p i ,  the consumption price index, does not depend on w i since p i  = (p_i),o 
and P- i  = w- i / ( .  
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Two different situations may arise: 
a) f l<a .  In this case we have a negative xternality. See Case I of Table 1. 
b) a<f l<a+ 
0(1 __if2) 
~(1 + aO- 20) " 
In this case a positive externality is possible; see Case II of Table 1 and the 
discussion below. 
0(1--a 2) 
(ii) 1/(2-a)<O<l and f l<a+ <a. 
~(1 + aO- 20) 
In this case we again have a negative xternality, see Case I of Table 1. 
At first sight, we have a third case in which ½<0<1/(2-a) and f l> 
a+ 0(1 -aE) [~( l+a0-20) ]  -1. From equation (10) we see that in this case 
both reaction curves have negative intercepts and negative slopes. Hence, there 
is no intersection of the curves in the first quadrant. This situation can be ruled 
out because fl > a + 0(1 - t~2)(~(1 +t~0 - 20)) -1 is equivalent to f l> 1. 
Next, consider the possibility of coordination between unions. If unions 
coordinate their activities, w A and w B are set such that 
2{(WAIpA)O(L~) 1-0} + (1 -2){(WB/pB)O(L~)I-O}, 0<2 < 1 
is maximized; 2 reflects the relative bargaining power of the two unions. This 
implies that the following first order conditions must hold: 
20( L~ ,~1-o (w~/p ) -OOL~ 
~ ~ WA/pA ) +2(1--0)  A OW A 
/ 
(1--2)0fl (WA) fl-1 W B ( L; ~1-0 
¢ t Z i# p~\wn/p ,  j =0 (13) 
and 
)( LA " ~;0 og~ 20fl (w B~fl-1 WA ( g~ ~1-0 
2( I -0  \ wA/p A / OW B ~ \ ~ ,I pA 2 \ wA/pA J
+ (1-2)o ( L ;  . . . . -o  
\w- -~/ /  +(1 -2) (1 -0) ( - -~ ,8 -~)  ~-=0.  (14) 
\ wB/p- / owB 
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In general, it is not possible to give expressions for the wage levels in the two 
sectors if unions coordinate their activities. Some qualitative statements, 
however, can be made. 
Cases (i)a and (ii), distinguished above, are the easiest o discuss. In these 
cases, unions incorporate the negative impact of their wage level on the 
employment level in the other sector. Higher wages in one sector also imply a 
higher consumption price index in the other sector. Both effects point in the 
same direction. Therefore we have negative externality in these cases: the 
cooperative wage level is below the Nash equilibrium level. Case (ii) is depicted 
in Figure 4b. 
Coordination of activities leads to higher wages if there is a positive xter- 
nality. We have seen that a positive xternality may exist in Case II of Table 1. 
The difficulty in this case is that a high wage level in one sector has two opposite 
W B WA(W B ) 
.C 
) 
WA 
Figure 4a 
W B WB(W A ) 
WA(W B) 
WA 
Figure 4b 
COORDINATING UNIONS, WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 335 
effects: a positive impact on the employment level in the other sector and a 
positive impact on the consumption price index. If the former impact out- 
weighs the latter, a positive externality results. A positive externality exists if 
the last two terms of equation (13) and the first two terms of equation (14) are 
positive. This is the case if, and only if, 
o. 
(1 - e)  OWB > 0P OWB " 
If 0 is close enough to zero the inequality holds and we arrive at point C in 
Figure 4a. Thus, a positive externality cannot be excluded on theoretical 
grounds. One union can raise employment in its own sector by setting the wage 
level lower than the optimal cooperative wage level. But if both unions tend to 
reduce wages to increase mployment, he direct impact on employment in 
their own sector is (partially) offset by a decrease in demand in line with the 
fallacy-of-composition argument. 
Note that the reaction curves are interchanged in the figures. Both cases ex- 
hibit strategic omplementarity in wages. So a change in If also induces 
multiplier effects in wages. The two cases illustrate that strategic omplemen- 
tarity rules out neither a negative nor a positive externality. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have studied a unionized economy in a two-sector general 
equilibrium model with imperfect competition. Unions set wages in their own 
sector and firms determine the level of employment. The two sectors are inter- 
related with each other, because agents in one sector demand goods produced 
in the other sector. A game is defined that consists of two subgames. In the first 
subgame, the unions play against each other. The outcome of this subgame is 
a wage vector. In the second subgame, firms are players and determine the de- 
mand for labour given the combination of wages. The model considered has in- 
teresting features apart from the issue of coordination between unions. An 
increase in foreign income is multiplied throughout the economy, although the 
model is of a general equilibrium kind. The multiplier becomes larger when the 
number of firms in a sector increases. 
The model is solved both with non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour of 
unions. We compared the levels of wages and employment in the situation 
where unions do not take into account the external effects of their wage claims 
with the situation where they coordinate their activities. In a classical view, 
unions are held responsible for excessive wages and too low employment. From 
the perspective of our study, two comments on this view can be made. In the 
first place, high wages may not be so bad for employment, because it may 
stimulate demand so that the negative impact on employment is (partially) off- 
set. In the second place, if a federation of unions exists and unions are willing 
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to cooperate, lower wages can be achieved even without intervention in the 
labour market by the federal government. 
Recently, policy coordination isone of the topics in international economics. 
In the literature on international coordination between countries (see e.g. 
Kehoe (1987)) an artificial figure of a 'world planner' has to be introduced to 
'enforce' coordination between countries. No such figure is needed to repre- 
sent coordinating unions in countries where federations of unions exist that are 
able to coordinate member unions' strategies. In such countries coordination 
between unions can be embedded in an existing institutional framework. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
In this appendix we show that Oy~'/OWi, i = A, B cannot be positive. Taking the 
derivative of equation (9) or (10) we get 
Oy* y~If/w~ ( f l -  ct)~naw_i/w ~ 
Ow i 1-  [a+ ( f l - c0~]  1 -  [c~+ ( f l -  ot)~] 2 ' 
This expression is positive only if 
i = A ,B .  
[l +a+( f l -a )y~I f+( f l -a ) (n t rw_ i< O, i = A ,B  
or, 
ct - f l>( l+ot )  ylf >( l+a)  ylf i=A,B .  (A.1) 
naw_i+ ~,~Ij mrw_~ + ~,lj' 
It is easy to see that if a set of values of ct and fl exists that satisfies (A. 1), then a ' s  
near-one and fl's near-zero are in that set. In case a = 1 and fl = 0 (A. 1) reduces to 
naw_i > ylf, i = A ,B  
Looking at equations (9) and (10), it is revealed that for a= 1 and f l=0 
wiy i = --rlcrw i + yIf 
Using (A.2) gives 
1 
niT(w_ i - wi) 
2-~ 
, i =A,B .  
wiyi < 2_~ (yIi- now_i) < o, 
which cannot be the case. Hence Oy*/Owi>O, i=A,B ,  can be ruled out. 
(A.2) 
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APPENDIX B 
In this appendix we arrive at equations (11) and (12). Unions choose wages uch 
that w/°(L*) 1- 0 is maximized. The first order condition is as follows: 
oL*+(1-O)~=O i=A,B.  (a.1) 
Wi 
Using equations (8) and (9) we know that 
(1-  a)na + y~If/w i ( f l -  a)~naIw_i/wi-  1] (B.2) 
L* =y*+a = 1- [a+( f l -a )~]  + 1-  [a+ ( f l -a )~ l  z 
and 
OL* _ y~If/w 2 (f l -  °t)~naw-i/w2 (B.3) 
OW i 1-  [a+ ( /3-a)~l  1 - [a+( f l - cz )~ l  z " 
Substituting (B.2) and (B.3) in (B. 1) and rearranging them, we get 
~I f /W i "}- (1 -- ct)naO(20-1) -1 
1-[a+(f l -a)~l 
( f l  - -  a )~nt7  [W_ i  /W i - -  0(20 - 1)-11 
+ =0 
1 - [a + ( /~-  a )~]  2 
Multiplying the numerator and the denominator f the first term by (1 + a + 
( f l -a)~) and the whole expression by w i, dropping the denominator 
1-  [a+ ( f l -  a)~12:~0, we get 
[1 + a+ ( f l -  a)~ly~If+ ( f l -  a)n~aw_ i = 
0 
1-20 
- -  {[1 + a + ( f l -  a)~](1 - a)na - (t~- a)~na} W i = 
0 
1-20 {1-a[a+(f l -a)~l}nawi"  
This implies 
W i ~ - -  
1-20  
0 
l+a+( f l -a )~ ~?~If  
+ I I -a [a+( f l -  
i = A, B. (B.4) 
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This is equation (11). Equation (11) has the following form 
WA = lt+)twB and WB~-,I.I+2WA, 
where 
and 
1-20  
/.t- 
O 
l+a+( f l -a )~ ] ?~Iy 
- - - [  1 -a -~+(~] J  na 
1-20 
2 -  
1-a[a  + ( f l -a )~ l  
A solution to this set of equations i
w~ : w~ = U/(1 - 2). 
Rewriting (B.7) gives 
1-20 [ (f l-a)~ .] = 
0 L 1 -a [a+( f l -a ) ( ] J  
0[ (1  - -  a 2 )  - -  a ( f l  - -  a)~]  - (1 - 20) ( f l -  a ) (  
O[1 - a [u  + ( f l -  u)~]]  
Substituting (B.6) and (B.9) in (B.8) yields equation (12). 
(B.5) 
(B.6) 
(B.7) 
(B.8) 
(B.9) 
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Summary 
COORDINATING UNIONS, WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 
In this paper we consider a two-sector economy in which individual unions are affiliated into a 
federation of unions. We analyze the consequences of two different types of wage setting. Firstly, 
individual unions et wages in their own sector without aking into account the effect of their wages 
on the employment level in the other sector. There may be positive as well as negative xternalities. 
A positive (negative) externality may exist if a higher (lower) wage in one sector implies a higher 
level of employment in the other sector. Both cases may occur in our model. Secondly, wages in 
the two sectors are set by the federation of unions. We show that in this case higher (lower) wages 
result han in the first case if a positive (negative) externality exists. 
